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KEEPING THE CITY TOTALLY CLEAN: 
YELLOW FEVER AND THE POLITICS 
OF PREVENTION IN COLONIAL 
SAINT-LOU IS-DU-SENEGAL, 1850-1914* 
BY KALALA NGALAMULUME 
Bryn Mawr College 
ABSTRACT: This article explores the ways in which French colonial authorities 
met the life and death challenge represented by the re-emergence of yellow fever 
epidemics in Saint-Louis-du-Senegal at a time when physicians knew very little 
about the etiology, diagnosis, transmission and treatment of most infectious and 
parasitic diseases. The discussion focuses on changing strategies and policies 
designed to address yellow fever threats, the attitudes and priorities of the auth- 
orities, the limits of 'colonial medicine' and the responses of people affected by 
sanitary measures. The article argues that because of the ignorance of the etiology 
and epidemiology of yellow fever, policies were misdirected and did not achieve 
their primary goals. Even after the introduction of germ theory, the gap between 
medical thinking and practice persisted for another decade. The African urban 
working class and underclass were the first victims of this state of affairs. The 
article also examines the conflict between the interests of public health, commerce 
and privacy rights. 
KEY WORDS: Senegal, health, colonial. 
SINCE K. David Patterson's observation in 1974 about African medical 
history as an untouched field, an increasing number of scholars have been 
focusing their attention on the relationship between disease, Western medi- 
cine and colonial rule in Africa.1 Thematically, the main concerns have 
related to the role of colonial medicine in the conquest of Africa,2 the social 
* The materials for the article were collected in 1994-5 during fieldwork research in 
Senegal and France assisted by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and from the 
Joint Committee of African Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the 
American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by the Ford, Mellon and 
Rockefeller Foundations, and in 2001 assisted by a Summer research grant from Bryn 
Mawr College, and in 2oo2 assisted by the Lindback Foundation Minority Grant. I thank 
them all for their support. I gratefully acknowledge the comments made on the earlier 
draft of this article by Professors David Robinson, Harold Marcus, Beverly Heckart, 
Gary McDonogh, Dr Fred Quinn and Philip Kilbride. I also wish to thank the 
anonymous readers of the Journal of African History for their critical comments. Any 
shortcomings are mine. 
1 K. D. Patterson, 'Disease and medicine in African history: a bibliographical essay', 
History in Africa, I (1974), I47. 
2 W. Cohen, 'Malaria and French imperialism', Journal of African History, 24 (I1983), 
23-36; N. E. Gallagher, Medicine and Power in Tunisia, I780-z9oo (Cambridge, 1983); 
Philip D. Curtin, Death by Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in 
the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1989); Philip D. Curtin, Disease and Empire: The 
Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa (Cambridge, 1989); R. Headrick, 
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history of several 'colonial diseases',' disease and urban segregation,4 disease 
ecology and political economy,5 medical ideologies6 and the medical 
profession.' Interpretations have also varied. Although most historians 
have looked at biomedicine as a tool of empire and a means of social control, 
they have disagreed on its effectiveness. Conservative interpretations have 
presented the history of Western medicine in Africa as an account of its 
successes in reducing mortality and in achieving population growth. 
Liberal interpretations have tried to show that the record of colonialism on 
health issues was a balanced one. Radical interpretations have emphasized 
racialized health policies, health inequalities and the introduction of new 
diseases. 
These works have greatly contributed to our understanding of the 
processes and structures that led to the imposition by the colonial state of 
biomedicine as the official medical practice as well as the responses to it, 
ranging from resistance and selective adhesion to accommodation and even 
appropriation. Studies examining cities, in particular, have helped us 
understand the factors that provided a rationale for change in urban policy 
Colonialism, Health and Illness in French Equatorial Africa, 1885-1935 (Atlanta, 1994). The list is suggestive, not exhaustive. 
3 R. Packard, White Plague, Black Labor: Tuberculosis and the Political Economy of 
Health and Disease in South Africa (Berkeley, 1989); M. Lyons, The Colonial Disease: A 
Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900-1940 (New York, 1992) ; N. E. 
Gallagher, Egypt's Other Wars: Epidemics and the Politics of Public Health (Syracuse NY, 
1990); J. P. Bado, Middcine coloniale et grandes endemies en Afrique, 90oo-0-960: lpre, 
trypanosomiase humaine et onchocerchose (Paris, 1996); E. Silla, 'People Are not the Same' : 
Leprosy and Identity in Twentieth Century Mali (Portsmouth NH, 1998); Myron 
Echenberg, Black Death, White Medicine: Bubonic Plague and the Politics of Public Health 
in Colonial Senegal, 1914-1945 (Portsmouth NH, 2002). 
4 Maynard W. Swanson, 'The sanitation syndrome: bubonic plague and urban native 
policy in the Cape Colony, Igoo-I909', Journal of African History, i8 (i977), 387-41o; E. M'Bokolo, 'Peste et societe urbaine ia Dakar: l'epidemie de 1914', Cahiers d'Etudes 
Africaines, 22 (1982), 13-46; Maynard W. Swanson, "'The Asiatic menace": creating 
segregation in Durban, 1870-1900', International Journal of African Historical Studies, 16 
(1983), 401-21; Philip D. Curtin, 'Medical knowledge and urban planning in tropical 
Africa', American Historical Review, 90 (1985), 594-613; C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 
Processus d'urbanisation en Afrique (2 vols.) (Paris, 1988); Odile Goerg, Pouvoir colonial, 
municipalites et espaces urbains, Conakry - Freetown des annees 1880 a 1914, vol. I: Genese 
des municipalites (Paris, 1997); Odile Goerg, 'From Hill Station (Freetown) to downtown 
Conakry (First Ward): comparing French and British approaches to segregation in 
colonial cities at the beginning of the twentieth century,' Canadian Journal of African 
Studies, 32 (1998), 1-31. 
' M. Turshen, The Political Ecology of Disease in Tanzania (New Brunswick NJ, 1984); 
E. A. Eldredge, 'Drought, famine and disease in nineteenth-century Lesotho', African 
Economic History, 16 (1987), 61-93; S. Feierman and J. M. Janzen (eds.), The Social Basis 
of Health and Healing in Africa (Berkeley, 1992). 
6 A. Patton, Physicians, Colonial Racism, and Diaspora in West Africa (Gainsville, 
1996); H. Deacon, 'Racism and medical science in South Africa's Cape Colony in the 
mid- to late nineteenth century', in R. MacLeod (ed.), 'Nature and empire: science and 
the colonial enterprise', Osiris, 15 (200ooo), 190-20zo6. 
7 John Iliffe, East African Doctors: A History of the Modern Profession (Cambridge, 
1998). 
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from early forms of cohabitation to urban residential segregation by race and 
class. However, these studies - focusing on malaria, bubonic plague and 
cholera - have emphasized the impact of the mosquito theory and the germ 
theory of disease on urban colonial planning, but have neglected the role 
played by the miasmatic theory of disease, which preceded it, in the genesis 
of segregationist ideas and practices. Recent scholarship has underlined 
the fact that steps taken by the colonial authorities before the introduction 
of germ theory helped lay the foundation for segregation. In his carefully 
researched book on plague in Dakar, Myron Echenberg pointed to the 
importance of yellow fever in establishing 'important precedents' for disease 
control well into the twentieth century.8 Another historian, Bruce Fetter, has 
in a recent article stressed the contribution of the 'commonsense innova- 
tions' of British medical officers in saving lives, 'even though they had no 
formal scientific rationale'.' This article will focus on yellow fever outbreaks 
in Saint-Louis-du-Senegal and political and social responses to them. It will 
contribute to the discussion on colonialism and urban residential segre- 
gation. In this regard, the study will complement the works of Philip Curtin 
and Odile Goerg in the light of new advances in health science, and the works 
of John Iliffe on the urban poor.10 The article argues specifically that 
the miasmatic theory of disease and the measures that it inspired contributed 
to the reduction of mortality, to the pathologization of those classified as 
indigenes (working poor and underclass) and to the emergence of urban seg- 
regationist practices. The emergence of the germ theory of disease brought 
the last two processes to fruition. The application of Western medical 
knowledge in Senegal resulted in a division among physicians and between 
colonial officials and municipal authorities, and in a conflict of interests 
between public health, commerce, popular culture and privacy rights. 
Evidence for this study is drawn from the archival materials, published 
sources and oral sources related to Saint-Louis's experience with yellow 
fever, one of the three 'exotic pestilential diseases', along with cholera and 
plague, that necessitated the application of permanent sanitary measures. 
Yellow fever occupied a special place in the minds of French authorities 
because of the recurrent and disruptive nature of the epidemics, the high 
mortality rates, the panic and flight that they provoked and the challenge that 
they posed to the rhetoric of the mission civilisatrice related to freeing the 
natives from the tyranny of disease over health, of instinct over reason and 
of ignorance and superstition over knowledge, without engaging what 
W. E. Connolly called the 'enigma of otherness'." Above all, yellow fever 
provided the material for the construction of the Africans as natural carriers 
of disease and a justification for segregation. 
8 Echenberg, Black Death, 23. 
9 Bruce Fetter, 'History and health science: medical advances across the disciplines', 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 32 (2002), 440. 
10 John Iliffe, The African Poor: A History (New York, I987); Curtin, Death by 
Migration; Curtin, Disease and Empire; Curtin, 'Medical knowledge'; Goerg, Pouvoir 
colonial, municipalites et espaces urbains. 
1 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political 
Paradox (Minnesota, 200oo2). 
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YELLOW FEVER THREATS, THE MIASMATIC THEORY AND 
THE 'GEOGRAPHY OF BLAME' 
In the second half of the nineteenth century Saint-Louis grew from a trading 
post to a commercial port city, the capital of Senegal and, for a while, the 
capital of French West Africa in the context of the emerging French empire. 
It included the city-island and three peri-urban villages of Guet Ndar, Ndar 
Toute and Sor. The early urban society included the Africans, a majority of 
whom were Wolof Muslims, and the French merchants; from their inter- 
action emerged a metis community, which would play a key role in commerce 
and politics. Saint-Louis attracted an increasing floating population in 
search of work or assistance. It remained the largest city in francophone West 
Africa until 1914, with a dynamic civil society, electoral institutions and an 
expression of citizenship which produced 'the biggest headaches' for the 
colonial administration, as David Robinson has pointed out.12 
However, Saint-Louis early on developed the reputation of being an 
unhealthy place. Indeed, urban growth and the unequal distribution of 
wealth and resources that accompanied it resulted in population growth 
and environmental contamination. International trade and travel and the 
inadequacies of public health policies were associated with the emergence 
and spread of viral, parasitic and bacterial diseases, which killed or disabled 
thousands of city residents. 
Yellow fever is a disease of forest monkeys in Africa and the Americas. The 
virus is transmitted by mosquito vectors as part of a monkey-to-mosquito 
cycle. The disease is endemic in the jungle where it circulates between 
monkeys, with occasional monkey-to-human transmission through infected 
female Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. These mosquitoes have also adapted to 
living around human agglomerations and multiplied in containers of clean 
water, leading to urban epidemics of yellow fever. Infected mosquitoes can 
also travel in ships and trains and spread the disease. Yellow fever thrives 
where there is adequate rainfall and warm weather. A person who becomes ill 
presents terrifying symptoms that cause panic: jaundice, high fever, internal 
hemorrhage and vomiting of black blood. It has been argued that the fact that 
symptoms were mild in children conferred immunity to permanent residents 
of endemic areas or areas frequently visited by yellow fever, thus restricting 
the outbreaks of epidemics to the sudden arrival of large groups of newcomers 
such as immigrants, soldiers, sailors, etc. This view can be found in Philip 
Curtin's assertion that 'yellow fever in West Africa was a strangers' disease, 
attacking those who grew up elsewhere'."l Curtin's interpretation was a 
reflection of official mortality statistics that provided more details about 
the Europeans and the 'assimilated' group than about the majority of the 
natives, who had limited access to medical services. But recent scholarship in 
molecular biology has revealed that a person who has been exposed to a viral 
12 David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial 
Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920 (Athens OH, 2zooo), 98. 
13 Curtin, Death by Migration, xiv, I30; Curtin, Disease and Empire, r o; Donald B. 
Cooper and Kenneth F. Kiple, 'Yellow fever', in Kenneth F. Kiple (ed.), The Cambridge 
World History of Human Diseases (New York, 1993), I 0ox; for a critique of Curtin, see 
Fetter, 'History and health science', 427. 
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or bacterial infection acquired protective 'immunity' not against reinfection 
but against severe or life-threatening symptoms.14 
14 Michael B. Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, and History (New York, 1998), i6; Stephen 
S. Hall, 'Billions of powerful weapons to choose from', in Maya Pines (ed.), Arousing the 
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Medical historians are still divided concerning the origin of yellow fever in 
Africa or the Americas. A Cuban physician, Dr. Carlos Finlay, identified in 
1881 a mosquito vector as its agent of transmission, but his theory remained 
in scientific limbo until it was verified in 1900 by J. Lazear, while the virus 
itself was discovered in 1901 by Dr. Walter Reed. Both were members of 
the American Yellow Fever Commission in Cuba.15 The first vaccine was 
developed in 1937.16 Before these discoveries yellow fever remained the most 
feared disease. Today, outbreaks of urban yellow fever still occur in some 
regions of West Africa between May and October, and in South America 
between January and April. 
Yellow fever struck Saint-Louis several times in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and produced thousands of casualties. Understanding 
the career of yellow fever in the city requires an analytical framework that 
focuses on agency and structure, and takes a critical look at the dominant 
interpretational model of the colonial health officers that tends to obscure 
some features of the re-emergence of yellow fever. As clinician and anthro- 
pologist Paul Farmer reminds us, the emergence of a disease can neither be 
fully understood nor explained if one does not take into account the inter- 
action between large-scale social forces, complex biosocial realities and local 
factors and actors." This approach can also shed light on other crucial issues 
that the outbreaks bring to the forefront of the debate such as scapegoating 
and stigmatization or medical profiling, associated with fear and suspicion.18 
Charles L. Briggs's concept of medical profiling has a great explanatory 
power in that it introduces a dichotomy within the body politic between 
sanitary citizens, who are expected to obey the laws and cooperate with 
health authorities to control the epidemics, and unsanitary subjects, who are 
not open to modernity and are likely uncooperative patients. By choosing the 
path of resistance, the unsanitary subjects relieve the government from any 
obligation to invest in their health.19 
Yellow fever ravaged Goree in 183o and returned in 1859 and I866 
without reaching Saint-Louis. But in 1867 it struck the city at the end of 
August and spread rapidly, provoking a general panic, and overwhelming 
the response capacity of the colonial authorities and the available health 
resources. When the disease subsided at the end of October, it had killed 
around 300 Europeans and hundreds of Africans.20 Before the advent of the 
mosquito theory, there were two overlapping theories of the disease: localism 
(or environmentalism) and contagionism. 
Fury of the Immune System: New Ways to Boost the Body's Defense (Chevy Chase, 1998), 
6-29. 
15 Francois Delaporte, The History of Yellow Fever: An Essay on the Birth of Tropical 
Medicine (Cambridge MA, i991). 
16 W. Biddle, A Field Guide to Germs (New York, 1995); Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, 
and History. 
17 Paul Farmer, Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues (Berkeley, 1999), 5. 
s18 For more details about stigmatization, see Philip Strong, 'Epidemic psychology: a 
model', Sociology of Health and Illness, I12 (1990), 249-59. 
19 Charles L. Briggs with Clara Mantini-Briggs, Stories in the Time of Cholera: Racial 
Profiling during a Medical Nightmare (Berkeley, 200oo3), xvi. 
20 Archives of the Congregation du Saint-Esprit, Chevilly-la-Rue (ACSE), Bulletin 
Gendral, 6.42 (1866-67), 183-4. 
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The localists argued that yellow fever had to do with local environmental 
conditions, both natural and human-made. Epidemics were understood to 
be caused by noxious miasmas emitted by decaying organic matters arising 
from the cemeteries, stagnant pools from floods and torrential rains that had 
transformed the streets of Saint-Louis into infected ponds, and the natural 
environment surrounding the city - a flat swampy land, the mouth of the 
Senegal River and the mixture of salty and non-salty water in the river 
around the city. The frequent and terrible 'winds from the south' during the 
summer months contributed to the spread of diseases. Other sources of 
miasmas included waste from animal slaughtering, and urine and manure 
from camels, mules, sheep, cows and horses left rotting in the streets and 
public spaces, and along the docks. Localists did not see yellow fever as a 
disease that could be transmitted from person to person; one could simply 
inhale miasmas or be exposed to the sunlight and get sick. 
The contagionists contended that yellow fever was caused by a kind of 
poison which could be transmitted through contacts between people or 
through infected buildings and objects such as clothes, merchandise, mail, 
skins, leather, wool and feathers, irrespective of the local sanitary conditions. 
Contagionists believed that yellow fever was not locally produced; instead, it 
was imported to the city from Sierra Leone, Gambia, Portuguese Guinea or 
Grand-Bassam via Goree and Dakar.21 
Besides these general causes of fevers, both localists and contagionists had 
identified other predisposing factors that they believed played a key role in 
determining the pattern of infection, especially who would get infected and 
die, who would recover and who would not get sick. These factors included 
unsanitary housing, tropical heat, poor diet, fatigue, bad habits and excesses 
and 'moral emotions' caused by frequent disputes resulting from cross- 
cultural miscommunication in situations of 'forced interaction' with the 
indigines - such as aboard ships - in which 'Europeans are obliged to refrain 
themselves' from taking any action that would worsen the increasingly 
strained race relations.22 
Techniques used to deal with the yellow fever threat combined both 
sanitationist and quarantinist approaches. The localists favored strategies 
aimed at attacking the predisposing factors and improving sanitation and 
hygiene enforced by municipal police, while the contagionists relied mainly 
on quarantines, sanitary cordons, disinfection and isolation. The two schools 
of thought were not incompatible, however, and did not form two permanent 
groups. There were probably few committed localists and contagionists; 
rather, the majority of public health officials found both explanations 
complementary.23 
The yellow fever policy of the mid-nineteenth century was formulated 
from an environmental and narrow contagionist perspective. To improve 
21 Archives Nationales du Senegal, Dakar (ANS), H zo, Public Hygiene and Sanitation 
Council (PHSC) meeting, Io Jan. 1868; for more on contagion and infection, see Peter 
Baldwin, Contagion and the State in Europe, z830-z930 (New York, 1999), 3-5- 
22 ANS, Section Afrique Occidentale Frangaise (AOF) I-4, Captain Doublet aboard 
'L'Etoile', I860, 42. 
23 ANS, AOF H 32-I4, 'Epiddmie de fievre jaune a Saint-Louis (23 juillet-z9 
novembre)', by Dr. Martialis, 3-4, 6. 
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the preparedness for epidemics, the public health officials recommended 
measures that emphasized sanitation and hygiene, disinfection, the isolation 
of European troops and an effective use of hospital services, as well as a 
surveillance program that would enforce the quarantine regulations applying 
to ships arriving from contaminated or suspected regions.24 Such measures 
had serious disruptive effects and an intrusiveness that the authorities 
underestimated, as I will discuss below. They were certainly convinced that 
the outbreak response was effective, however. But yellow fever subsided 
simply because of the extended cold weather from January through May, 
which sent mosquitoes into hibernation, and the short life-span (less than 
two months) of the female A. aegypti. 
Efforts to control a disease about which little was known and to avoid its 
recurrence heightened the anxieties that the French felt about Senegal. 
While the yellow fever policy was implemented, a cholera epidemic ravaged 
Saint-Louis in November 1868 and within a month it had killed i,112 
indigenes - 5,000 according to missionary sources25 - and 92 Europeans,26 
including Governor Pinet-Laprade, out of a population of 20,000. The 
succession of outbreaks challenged the basic assumptions about the inter- 
action between the French and the indigenes and provided the authorities 
with a rationale for accelerating the change in urban policy from cohabitation 
to racial and class segregation that had started a decade earlier. Health 
authorities first targeted Saint-Louis's marketplace, which they perceived 
as a source of miasmas generated by foodstuffs that were exposed to the 
burning sun. In addition, the marketplace was described as the site of 'forced 
agglomeration of individuals, almost naked, the majority of whom have no 
notion of decency, who presented to the European population from the 
metropole a revolting as well as immoral spectacle'.27 The marketplace was 
transferred to Ndar Toute. The authorities next targeted unsanitary housing, 
especially the shacks located in the city center that were seen as breeding 
grounds for the disease, and decided to eliminate the indigenes from the city 
center. Known as the bataille de la paillotte (war on shacks or thatch-roofed 
houses) during Faidherbe's tenure in the I85os and I86os, the policy of 
forced removals continued between I871 and 1873 to include the streets of 
Saint-Paul in the north and Saint-Joseph in the south.28 The authorities 
presented the policy as based not on race but on class, social status and 
culture, especially the living standards and the degree of westernization or 
modernity, which explains why it did not affect the metis and Muslim 
merchant families. The policy was justified by the inability of the indigenes to 
meet the requirements of the building codes in order to prevent frequent 
fires during the cold season. 
The evidence suggests that the policy of forced removals was actually 
inspired by racial prejudice, however. Studies on race and ethnic relations 
24 ANS, ]Voniteur du Se'ngal et Dependances, I867, 643; ANS/Hzo/Senegal, PHSC 
meeting, Io-I I Jan. 1868. 
25 ACSE, Bulletin General, t. 6 (1868-9), 864. 
26 Archives Nationales de France, Aix-en-Provence (ANFSOM), Series geographique 
Senegal, xI 30, chief medical officer, Rulland, to governor, 3 Jan. 1869. 
27 ANFSOM, Series geogr. Senegal, xII 9, Administration Council meeting, 25 Sept. 
I869. 28 ANS, Moniteur, 25 Feb. I873, I. 
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have shown that it is possible to 'fence in' a set of beliefs by periodically 
admitting to exceptions, and to look down upon the majority of others in the 
same category, who, presumably, are really 'typical'.29 The specific historical 
situation of Saint-Louis, with the structural features of its commerce and 
its complex political and civil society, can help explain why the metis and 
Muslim merchant families were defined as exceptions and categorized as 
sanitary citizens. Yellow fever and cholera outbreaks and the imagined or real 
class character that they took led the health authorities to construct the 
indigines as natural targets for particular diseases and as threats to the health 
of the Europeans and people associated with them. In French thinking, the 
indigenes had disqualified themselves from sanitary citizenship by refusing 
to adopt French cultural values and ideas of progress, and were therefore 
situated outside modernity and 'civilization'. They were 'different', 'other', 
and the social difference was located in their customs, habits, lifestyles and 
sexuality. Their women were seen littering and bathing naked in public, and 
these practices were viewed as the result of 'self-negligence' and 'the absence 
of sentiments that distinguish people who respect themselves', despite the 
claim made a decade earlier by Hamet Ndiaye Anne, cadi (judge) of the 
Muslim Tribunal, that the 'old habits have ended'."3 Being classified as 
indigenes had serious implications concerning the ways in which they would 
be treated by the colonial authorities, as the next epidemics revealed. 
The 1878 yellow fever epidemic was part of the pandemic that affected 
most Atlantic societies from Philadelphia and Memphis to Rio de Janeiro 
and Freetown, as a result of globalization of trade and travel. It arrived from 
Brazil in May, brought to Dakar by Le Niger and L'Orenique. The boats were 
not quarantined.31 The epidemic was declared in Goree in mid-July and in 
Saint-Louis in September, only after the infection had spread from the 
indigenes to the Europeans. Despite the control measures adopted by the 
authorities, ranging from quarantine and cordons sanitaires to health edu- 
cation,32 yellow fever spread in the city and, by December, it had killed 652 
Europeans out of a European population of 1,300, including 14 Sisters of 
Saint-Joseph de Cluny who cared for the sick, and an undetermined number 
of middle-class residents and indigines. 
Many factors contributed to high mortality. Immigration from France, 
wars and famine in the countryside swelled the population of Saint-Louis, 
now a city of I6,ooo residents. Urban growth had created vast problems 
of sewage, waste removal, housing and water supply, and had increased 
the quantity of breeding places for mosquitoes. To make sense of the crisis, 
the authorities looked for scapegoats. Some in Paris resigned themselves 
to the fact that, because of its climatic conditions, Senegal was especially 
29 Hubert M. Blalock, Jr, Race and Ethnic Relations (Englewoods Cliffs NJ, 1982), 
20-I. 
30 ANS H 21, Special Commission meeting, 2 July 1864; ANS H 20, PHSC meeting, 
Io Jan. 1868. 
31 ANFSOM, Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce to the Ministry of Navy, 16 May 
I878, in Series geogr. Senegal, xI 34, Navy Health Superior Council meeting of 30 Jan. 
I879. 
32 ANS AOF H 28-2, governor's decision no. I5 of 2 July I878; ANS AOF H 28-4, 
decision of governor, no. I7 of 27 July I878; ANS AOF H 28-5, decree no. 16 of 28 July 
I878; ANS AOF H 28-37, Ordonnateur to governor, 6 Aug. I878. 
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vulnerable to yellow fever. Others pointed to bureaucratic deficiencies. 
Others argued that only prevention could spare Senegal from another epi- 
demic, especially the application to Senegal of the provisions of the law of 
3 March i822 and the decree of 22 February 1876 empowering the sanitary 
police to enforce quarantine.33 The final solution, some suggested, was the 
separation between the Europeans and the indigenes as 'an element of first 
importance from the point of view of hygiene'. But such a measure, they 
realized, could not apply to the existing agglomerations, such as Saint-Louis, 
Dakar or Conakry, where it would not find supporters among the merchants 
who were primarily concerned with profit, not hygiene. Separation would be 
possible only in future agglomerations,34 given that a significant number of 
Muslim residents had been French nationals since I830.35 In the meantime, 
the authorities focused on enforcing the quarantine regulations and other 
sanitary measures. Soon, they would face another health threat that would 
reveal that, despite their presence in the 'right' social category - that of 
sanitary citizens - the metis and Muslim merchants did not necessarily share 
the administration officials' perception of health risks and did not appreciate 
the pathologization of the indigenes who were their supporters and voters. 
In May 1879 fear and suspicion spread among the colonial authorities as 
cases of fever and diarrhea accompanied by vomiting were observed among 
city residents. The anxiety was justified not only by the coming of the rainy 
season and the possibility of another epidemic, but also because of an influx 
of hundreds of European troops into Saint-Louis. The unknown illness 
provoked an intense debate during a key meeting of the Sanitary Commission 
of 14 May 1879, presided over by Pierre Carpot, Ordonnateur, who rep- 
resented the administration. In a report to the governor the day before, 
doctors had linked the symptoms to the offensive smells from rotting fish 
coming from Guet Ndar, and had called on the public health officials to 
remove the 'focus of infection'. Pierre Carpot blamed Mayor Gaspard 
Deves, from one of the leading metis families, for tolerating the 'general 
unregulated fishing' in Guet Ndar and for his unwillingness to implement 
the recent sanitary measures, which had provisions for a new location for fish 
smoking at the extreme south of Guet Ndar in order to minimize the threat to 
the city's welfare. Standing as 'the defender of the material interests of the 
indigenes and those of the city', Deves took great pains to argue that the 
fishing industry was not a threat to the city's health and that the indigenes had 
the right to dry fish and earn a living. He reminded the participants that even 
during the tenure of Governor Pinet Laprade (1865-9) no workable solution 
could be found to the issue, and that the only viable alternative chosen by the 
Municipal Council in 1878 was to prohibit fish smoking during the rainy 
season. He presented contrary evidence indicating that those symptoms were 
sporadic and were sometimes observed among the indigenes who ate fish 
without enough spices and hot pepper during the cold season. He concluded 
33 ANFSOM, Series geogr. S~negal, XI 34, Navy Health Superior Council meeting, 
30 Jan. 1979. 
34 ANS/H32, a draft of an unfinished letter, no author or date listed. 
35 Dominique Sarr and Richard Roberts, 'The jurisdiction of Muslim tribunals in 
colonial Senegal, I857-I932', in Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (eds.), Law in 
Colonial Africa (London, I99I), 131-45. 
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that the causes of the ailments - known as n'diank - could be found else- 
where. But where Deves focused on similarities - the same symptoms af- 
fecting the indigenes - Dr. Pierre-Adolphe Doue, acting chief medical officer, 
saw the essential 'differences' between the Europeans and the indigenes. His 
thesis was that different diets and different living conditions could not 
possibly result in similar symptoms. He reported that three officers who had 
recently visited Guet Ndar contracted the illness while crossing the Servatius 
Bridge on their way back to the city-island. In response, Deves ruled out the 
suggestion that the fishing industry would be the 'unique cause' of the ill- 
ness. But a vote at the end of the debate on the issue of 'fish smoking as a 
danger for the sanitary situation of Saint-Louis', and 'what to do about it', 
resulted in a majority in favor of an immediate ban recurring every year on I 
May.36 One of the consequences of the ban was the exodus of adult fishermen 
in search of work as laptots (pilots) or traitants (commercial agents) along the 
Senegal River. 
The health crisis revealed not only the strength of the alliance between the 
Deves clan and their African supporters and commercial allies in Guet Ndar 
and Saint-Louis's hinterland, but also the jealousies of their competitors as 
well as the underlying hostility between the administration and the Deves 
clan - which would lead to Deves's revocation as mayor in i880 on the basis 
of fraud charges."37 The evidence suggests that the sanitation syndrome, 
described by M. Swanson in South Africa, was at work in Senegal as well. 
It referred to dealing with urban race relations in the imagery of infection 
and epidemic disease.38 In Saint-Louis the yellow fever epidemic gave way 
to an epidemic of fear and suspicion and to an epidemic of stigmatization 
of the indigenes.39 Guet Ndar, the most populous and most disadvantaged 
peri-urban village, was now seen as the focus of infection and the 'space 
of death',40 where people, fish, beaches and even the air were infected and 
contagious. 'Civilized' persons, or sanitary citizens, who went there returned 
sick. It was the 'heart of darkness', to use a familiar expression. 
In light of the preventive measures adopted by the public health auth- 
orities, many, like Governor Briere de l'Isle, hoped that the recent epidemic 
would be 'the last human hecatomb'.41 But their hope was premature. 
Indeed, yellow fever re-emerged in 1880 and 1881, producing respectively 
8o and 503 victims among the Europeans, including the newly arrived 
Governor De Lanneau, and creating panic, racial hysteria and a siege men- 
tality. In the words of an eyewitness, the epidemic deprived the colony of its 
'arms and head'.42 Yellow fever was now seen as endemic to Senegal; the 
epidemic was understood as a simple transformation from endemic to epi- 
demic disease under the pressure of climatic conditions and the natural and 
social environment. Many officials became convinced that the repatriation to 
36 ANS H 22, Sanitary Commission meeting, 14 May 1879. 
37 On the revocation, see Robinson, Paths of Accommodation, lo9, 283 nn. 66, 67. 
38 Swanson, 'Sanitation syndrome', 387. 
39 For more on the subject, see Strong, 'Epidemic psychology: a model', 249-59. 
40 Michael Taussig, Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and 
Healing (Chicago, 1987), 3- 
41 ANS AOF H 32-39, Inauguration du monument eleve ia la memoire des officiers du 
Corps de la Santei de la Marine pendant l'ipidemie de 1878. 
42 ACSE, Journal de la Communauti, entry for 4 Aug. 1881. 
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France of non-essential personnel before the rainy season would be the only 
way to save European lives without generating unnecessary high costs,43 
while others hoped that building ten public toilets and providing the police 
chief with a horse for round-the-clock surveillance would suffice to keep the 
city totally clean.44 Dr. Chassaniol, who saw himself as an 'impotent pioneer 
of science', nurtured the hope that 'a variation of medication based on the 
chemical science and the microscopic observations made by Pasteur could 
lead to a rational treatment' in the near future.45 But some officials were 
dissatisfied with the routine ways of responding to the epidemic. They ar- 
gued in favor of a 'radical solution',46 including measures such as an auto- 
matic quarantine on all arriving ships during the rainy season, the expulsion 
of the floating population and the total elimination of the indigenes from the 
city-island. Radicals contended that the sanitary measures adopted to that 
point were ineffective because they were always either partially implemented 
or postponed, or simply rejected for a variety of reasons once an epidemic 
departed." 
With yellow fever taking such a significant toll on the lives of the colonial 
city and creating terror, the government had to act more forcefully. Indeed, 
the decree of 29 August 1884 that reorganized the Sanitary Service, especially 
article I 13, title v, imposed an automatic annual quarantine of five days be- 
tween I June and 15 December on all ships arriving from the areas situated 
between the Pointe Sangomar and Gabon even if the ship captains had a 
clean bill of health, since the region was perceived as 'dangerous' and the 
ships 'suspect'. The provisions of the decree required a considerable number 
of sanitation workers, the presence of a doctor aboard postal ships or any 
ships carrying ioo or more Europeans for more than 48 hours, the inter- 
rogation under oath of ship captains on health matters and the building of 
infrastructure (lazarettos, or isolation hostels, observation posts and equip- 
ment for disinfection). For those who contravened these measures, the 
decree imposed draconian provisions, ranging from the death penalty to life 
in prison and fines.48 But the authorities did not make any effort to evaluate 
the challenges presented by such a costly surveillance program in terms of 
qualified and motivated personnel, and financial and material resources. 
Their decision rested upon the questionable assumption that sanitary 
citizens would cooperate in epidemic preparedness. But the authorities 
encountered opposition from both unsanitary subjects and sanitary citizens. 
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS: PUBLIC HEALTH, COMMERCE 
AND PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Objections to the automatic quarantine came mostly from French, British 
and Portuguese merchants who were angry about the interruption of all 
43 ANS AOF H 32-36, ordinance of Governor de Lanneau, 29 July 1881. 
44 ANS, General Council meeting, 17 Feb. I882, 48-9. 
45 ANS AOF H 33-173, Dr. Chassaniol to Governor Canard, 7 Sept. i881. 
46 ANS H 32, Hygiene Commission meeting, 25 July i88I. 
47 ANS H 22, Dr. Desgrange to governor, 28 Apr. 1883. 
48 ANS AOF H 2, sanitary police law, title II, art. 7-14, 4 Mar. 1822; decree 
reorganizing the Sanitary Service in Senegal, titles I--XI, 26pp, 29 Aug. I884. 
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kinds of communication and exchange between colonial port-cities under the 
new measures. Moreover, the authorities restricted the quarantine to im- 
ported merchandise and exported products. On 12 September 1885 British 
merchants operating in Sierra Leone addressed a letter to V. Bareste, French 
vice-council in Freetown, in which they expressed their concern about 
the great inconvenience, loss of time and money, entailed upon us by the existing 
quarantine regulations in the Rivers to the North of this port. In view of the fact 
that there is no epidemic or disease of any kind prevalent (except the ordinary 
African fever, of which there are only very few cases, these cases confined to natives 
of Sierra Leone) we feel that your government would be justified in raising the 
quarantine.49 
Many of the merchants' complaints were justified. Ships were inspected 
and quarantined for five to twenty-three days depending on the presence or 
absence of morbidity or mortality at the port of departure or aboard the 
ships, and on the nature of the commodities. Merchandise was unloaded and 
disinfected at the lazaret, often resulting in long delays that were due either 
to the incompetence and the unwillingness of the sanitary workers to fulfill 
the required tasks or to inadequate infrastructure. Merchants and ship cap- 
tains wanted to avoid medical inspections and quarantines at all costs. Some 
ship captains were unloading their passengers before entering the ports."s 
There were reports that British doctors in Sierra Leone and Gambia were 
issuing fraudulent bills of health that had no mention of yellow fever, thus 
giving an unfair advantage to British merchants vis-ai-vis their French 
competitors. Very often, yellow fever was disguised by describing other, 
less frightening diseases."51 The reference to the 'ordinary African fever ... 
confined to natives' can be understood in this context. It was presented as a 
fever that was natural to Africans and did not require any special medical 
attention, thus corroborating the idea that as long as a disease affected the 
natives, it did not require intervention. In any case, British merchants' mis- 
representation of the sanitary situation, inspired by greed or profit motives, 
underlined the problems that the colonial powers had to resolve in their 
effort to establish a regional surveillance system of outbreaks. Besides these 
managerial problems, merchants raised serious doubts about the scientific 
knowledge on which all these 'radical measures' and 'irrational practices' 
were based, at the time when newspapers featured commercials about new 
disinfection machines 'capable of destroying the microbes of yellow fever in 
a few minutes at a temperature of more than i oo degrees'. 52 Navy officers too 
contended that the quarantine was detrimental to the conduct of war in 
Soudan because it affected the supplies to the troops.53 
49 ANS AOF H 37-58, 'Merchants and traders of Sierra Leone' to Mr. V. Bareste, 
12 Sept. I885. 
50 ANS H 2, chief medical officer's report, 3 May 1889; ANS H 2, governor to interior 
director, 27 May 1889; ANS H 2, E. Etienne, undersecretary of state for colonies to 
governor, 29 June 1889; ANS H 4, Sanitary Commission meeting, 25 Aug. 1892. 
51 ANS H 2, chief medical officer's report, 3 May 1889; ANS H 2, governor to interior 
director, 27 May I889; ANS H 2, E. Etienne, undersecretary of state for colonies to 
governor, 29 June I889; ANS H 4, Sanitary Commission meeting, 25 Aug. I892. 
52 ANS H 4, Sanitary Commission meeting, 25 Aug. 1892. 
53 ANS H 4, Sanitary Commission, i Sept. 1892. 
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Despite biomedicine's increasing role in shaping and maintaining the 
colonial order, the pressure from sanitary citizens and various chambers of 
commerce was such that the authorities in Saint-Louis and Paris had to 
find ways to reconcile the interests of commerce and those of public 
health. The outbreak of cholera in Saint-Louis in 1893, which killed 9oo - 
indigenes - 1,500 to 2,ooo according to missionary sources54 - and 90- 
Europeans,55 did not prevent Governor de Lamothe from recommending 
the abrogation or at least the modification of articles i 13 and I 14 of the decree 
of 29 August 1884. The annual quarantine was eventually lifted.56 In com- 
pliance with the resolutions of the 1892 Venice international convention, the 
1893 Dresde international sanitary convention, the 1896 decree applied in 
France and Algeria and the 1897 Venice international convention on sanitary 
police, a new surveillance system that unified and consolidated the legislation 
previously applied was put in place in 1897. It required passengers to obtain 
sanitary passports. For suspect ships or passengers without sanitary pass- 
ports, it imposed a quarantine of seven days for cholera and nine days for 
yellow fever or plague at the lazaret, and the unloading and disinfection of 
merchandise and the ship.57 
The implementation of the 1897 decree created serious problems. The 
infrastructure was inappropriate and, in many places, simply non-existent. 
In addition, the majority of merchants voiced their opposition to the new 
quarantine measures, which they described as 'inefficient and absurd', in 
part because of the deficient organization or the underdevelopment of health 
services. The Chamber of Commerce and the Sanitation Commission even 
recommended the acquisition of disinfection machines as a solution to 'the 
costly and unpopular quarantine'." The debate about the quarantines can be 
understood in the framework of a larger debate that was going on in France 
and was animated by the members of the Colonial Party, who were pushing 
for a policy of mise en valeur of the colonies. In June 1899 the two-year-old 
quarantine was in fact abandoned because of its negative effects on com- 
merce, despite the doctors' apprehension that the return of the epidemic 
'would be a calamity, and the ruin for the colony'." The doctors' fear was 
not irrational given the unresolved problems of preparedness for epidemics. 
On 19 May 19oo several cases of yellow fever were reported in Dakar. 
Rumors and anxiety spread in Saint-Louis as residents feared that, in the 
case of an epidemic, the quarantine and cordons sanitaires would eliminate 
the limited opportunities for escape.60 On io June, the imposition of a 
quarantine on Dakar and the confirmed news that yellow fever had spread to 
Goree and Rufisque provoked hysteria among residents in Saint-Louis. 
Yellow fever reached the city's garrisons on 18 July and unconfirmed rumors 
54 ACSE, i46-A, Senegal Iv, Histoire du Senegal 1845-98, entry for 1892-3, 205. 
55 ANFSOM, Series geogr. Senegal, xI d. 30, Chief Medical Officer H. Rulland to 
governor, 'Rapport sur l'epidemie de cholera de Saint-Louis', 3 Jan. 1869. 
56 ANS H 46, decree of 29 Dec. 1893 modifying the decree of 29 Aug. 1884. 
57 ANS, Bulletin Officiel du Senegal, 1897, decree of 31 Mar. 1897, 343. 
58 ANS H 4, Chamber of Commerce to Colonial Commission, ii Sept. 1898. 
59 ANS H 22, chief medical officer to governor-general, 2 June I899. 
s0 For more on panic, see J. B. Perry, Jr, and M. D. Pugh, Collective Behavior: 
Response to Social Stress (New York, I1978), Ioo-I. 
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circulated that the authorities were making plans for a rapid repatriation of 
civil servants and troops. The onset of a dangerous situation gave rise to panic. 
Merchants mobilized for flight. As new cases were reported, the authorities 
finally used the tools at their disposal, especially quarantine, repatriation of 
non-essential personnel and the liming of suspected houses to protect the city 
and its 30,000 residents, including 1,5oo Europeans, from the epidemic. 
Between July and September, when the last cases were reported, 228 resi- 
dents, including 49 Europeans, had succumbed to yellow fever; hundreds 
of Europeans were repatriated, including Governor-General E. Chaudie, 
and some prominent civil servants. Many metis and other African residents 
had also deserted the city.61 L'Echo de Paris reported that 'a complete 
anarchy exists in Senegal since the hasty departure of M. Chaudie and the 
shameful flight of some civil servants following the example of their chief; it 
is unacceptable that the telegraph no longer functions'.62 Dr. Noel Ballay, 
governor of Guinea, went to Dakar to replace Chaudie.63 The quarantine 
was lifted in early January 1901. The 900oo outbreak proved that the city 
was better prepared to handle a new epidemic crisis, as evidenced by low 
mortality rates compared to previous years. 
In their zeal to protect the city against the new outbreak, the authorities 
targeted the unsanitary subjects they suspected of spreading the disease. 
Thirty-five suspected Syrian peddlers operating between Saint-Louis and 
other coastal cities were blamed for buying and selling contaminated clothes 
previously used by people who became victims of yellow fever. They were 
ordered to submit to medical examination and issued identity cards in order 
to control their movement.64 Four single women working for the Sarrazin 
family on Parquet Street as domestic servants, and who had friendly relations 
with the crew members of the ship Saint Kilda, were blamed for the spread 
of yellow fever. A local publisher and notable, Cornu, affirmed that the crew 
of Saint Kilda brought the 'germ' of yellow fever and passed it along to the 
women, who in turn contaminated the troops. Another source of infection, 
he believed, was a small house located at the end of the same street where 
other negresses de mauvaise vie (prostitutes) lived and were visited by French 
troops. He felt that it was his duty to report these 'facts' to the authorities.65 
The police chief, J. Avrial, confirmed these allegations and recommended 
that Mrs. Sarrazin's house be disinfected.66 The authorities considered single 
women dangerous: they were saturated with sexuality and, thus, a threat to 
city's health.67 
'6 ANS H 25, Municipal Council, 30 July 19o00; ANS AOF H 45-107, lists of deaths; 
ACSE, 'Journal', entry for ii Aug. 1900, 385-6. 
62 L'Echo de Paris, 5 Sept. 900oo, . 
63 Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, I900-1945 (New York, 
1971), 395. 64 ANS AOF H 41-3, decision of governor-general, 22 May x9oo; see also ANS H 
4I-6, chief medical officer to governor-general, 27 May 1900oo. 
65 ANS/H44/234, Cornu to governor-general, 2I July I9oo. 
66 ANS AOF H 45-235, J. Avrial to governor-general, 21 July 1900oo. 
67 For more information on the 'hysterization of women's bodies', see Michel 
Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. I: An Introduction, trans, from the French by 
Robert Hurley (New York, 1976), Io4-5. 
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Throughout the epidemic crisis, opposition to anti-yellow fever measures 
increased. The office of the governor-general was flooded with complaints 
from all over Senegal and French West Africa about the negative impact 
of the quarantine and cordons sanitaires on food supplies and prices of 
commodities. The 'Europeans and inhabitants of Tivaouane' protested 
against the suspension of the delivery of ice made in Saint-Louis described as 
'a precious resource for the society' and 'the most precious auxiliary for 
the doctor during the rainy and hot season'."6 By August eight Muslim 
merchants from the same town requested permission to get kola nuts, their 
'only resource', shipped from Rufisque. They expressed the fear that the 
interruption of commerce and the lack of money for food and other basic 
necessities would destroy their lives.69 Protests continued throughout 
the summer months. Traders from the hinterland of Dakar, Rufisque and 
Saint-Louis, who were directly affected by the quarantine measures, voiced 
their opposition to measures they found 'radical'. In a strongly worded letter 
to the governor-general dated 7 September 19oo, M. Meyer, the represen- 
tative of the Societe le Syndicat du Soudan Franfais, opposed the rigorous 
quarantine, which resulted in a great loss for the traders. He wrote that he 
could not find one example in Europe or elsewhere in other colonies where 
commerce was completely stopped because of the epidemic. He emphasized 
that because the quarantine intervened between August and September, at 
exactly the same time when the Senegal River was navigable until Kayes, the 
flow of goods along the river was reduced dramatically.7" 
The local Saint-Louis elite also opposed the quarantine. During the 
meeting of the Colonial Commission of 28 July I900, Justin Deves shifted 
emphasis from economic, administrative and psychological reasons to 
medical reasons for the suppression of the quarantine. He contended that 
physicians were helpless against a disease 'that escaped modern science and 
empirical processes', and that yellow fever affected only a small percentage of 
the urban residents (Europeans), but it interrupted the economic and social 
life of all. Instead of quarantine, Devils argued, the best solution would be to 
provide Europeans with medical leave and/or home care during the summer 
rains. This proposal suggested that the metis and other Africans perceived 
yellow fever as the 'white man's disease' that did not affect them, thus 
reflecting the official thinking concerning racial susceptibility. Indeed, the 
general consensus among health officials was that yellow fever provided 
immunity to Africans who were infected in childhood; as a result, adults 
who were reinfected developed only attenuated or mild symptoms that went 
unnoticed though they remained 'active carriers of the epidemics'. It was 
believed that Europeans, in contrast, did not have that acquired immunity; 
the most vulnerable among them were not those who had survived yellow 
fever and were 'seasoned', but the newcomers and those who were experi- 
encing their second or third hivernage. This inequality before death was 
summarized in a popular saying which stated that 'the bourgeoning of the 
baobab leaves (hivernage) announced the imminent death of the Europeans, 
68 ANS H 42-Io8, Administrator Decressac-Villagrand to governor-general, 4 July 
1900. 
* ANS AOF H 4I-114, 'Habitants of Tivaouane' to governor-general, 2 Aug. 19oo. 
70 ANS AOF H 41-75, Meyer to governor-general, 7 Sept. 19oo. 
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and the cold season that of the Africans'." The saying referred to the per- 
ceived European vulnerability to yellow fever during hivernage and African 
susceptibility to waterborne and respiratory diseases during the cold season. 
Deves was certainly alluding to this widespread belief. The Municipal 
Council, dominated by the metis, also shared the same views and rec- 
ommended that the sanitary measures affecting trade be implemented with 
'wisdom and prudence'.72 But Deves's proposed solution to the quarantine 
also reflected the bad blood between the Deveis clan and the administration. 
The Deves brothers had sponsored the publication of a satirical newspaper, 
called Le Reveil du Se'negal, that was very critical of the governor, prominent 
civil servants and the Catholic Church.73 Despite the pressure from the 
merchants and local elite, the quarantine remained in place. The economic, 
social and psychological consequences of yellow fever were such that the 
central administration in Paris decided to investigate the situation. 
The Grall-Marchoux mission arrived in Senegal in February 90oi to 
identify the causes of yellow fever epidemics and to suggest the solutions. Its 
conclusions favored the hypothesis of the external origin of yellow fever, but 
opposed the annual quarantine, incineration and disinfection. The mission 
recommended new legislation consistent with the logic of 'modern science', 
a reference to the discovery of the mode of transmission of malaria and 
filariosis verified by Ross in 1898, which called for the destruction of the 
mosquitoes and larvae and the isolation of the infected persons as soon as the 
first signs and symptoms of the disease appeared.74 The administration 
had to drain swamps, bogs, moats and other bodies of standing water in the 
northern part of Saint-Louis, Sor and on Bop-N'Kior island which were 
the breeding grounds for mosquitoes. The authorities needed to build new 
garrisons and a new hospital with sufficient ventilation and light, and to 
install screens on the windows in order to keep out insects and mosquitoes. 
The new scientific knowledge also required that the authorities apply 
insecticides in houses, prisons, meeting places and ships in order to prevent 
further exposure to infectious agents. Other recommendations included 
filtering the drinking water, and flushing refuse from areas of human 
habitation. 
Convinced that the natives and other foreign minorities (Moors, 
Moroccans and Syrians) were 'active carriers of epidemics', thus 'dangerous 
groups', the Sanitary Mission also strongly suggested a form of 'sanitary 
segregation' in order to prevent European troops from interacting with 
African troops or, at least, to authorize a limited interaction with an 
indispensable fraction of their European cadres necessary for the daily 
running of the service. In brief, the mission suggested an ambitious program 
that required a commitment of considerable financial resources, estimated 
at 4,908,000 francs.75 The measures reflected the sanitation syndrome that 
71 See Georges Courreges and Fadel Dia, Saint-Louis du Senegal (Clermont-Ferrand, 
1982). 
72 ANS H 25, Municipal Council meeting, 30 July I9oo. 
73 Francois Zuccarelli, La vie politique Sinegalaise (I789-z940) (Paris, 1987), 62-3. 
74 See Constant Mathis, L'Eeuvre des Pastoriens en Afrique Noire (Paris, 1946), 9-14; 
Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, and History, 45-72. 
75 ANS AOF H 48-I, 'Mission Sanitaire du Senegal (fevrier-mars 1901)'; ANS AOF 
H 49-12, Colonial Hygienic Committee meeting, 6 Mar. 1901. 
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characterized the colonial mentality and corroborated the idea that the germ 
theory coexisted with the miasmatic theory during a transitional period 
ending in 1914.76 
Despite the hopes raised by the new knowledge and the formulation of 
a rational sanitation program, when three new cases of yellow fever were 
reported in early October i901, another great wave of fear and panic spread 
throughout the city. The government reimposed the quarantine. Merchants 
of Saint-Louis protested these 'excessive cordons sanitaires' and 'unnecess- 
ary draconian measures' that created hardship for the city residents. The 
fishermen were unable to get out of their quarters for ten days. The officials 
faced the possibility of social unrest if the chief medical officer did not 
extend the perimeter of the cordon sanitaire to allow food movements into 
the city.77 
IMPROVING EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF STIGMA 
In early 1902 Governor-General N. Ballay died after less than two years in 
office and was replaced by E. Roume, a former director in the Ministry of 
Colonies, who had connections with the financial circles in Paris. Under the 
new leadership, the government of French West Africa obtained fiscal 
autonomy and a centralized bureaucracy. Roume's strategy in 1902 and 1903 
included both preventative measures and a contingency repatriation plan for 
non-essential personnel in case of medical emergency. 
But the authorities' concern for epidemic preparedness was not matched 
by city residents, who either ignored the new preventive measures or applied 
them with skepticism. The marabouts (Islamic clerics) from Guet Ndar 
protested against what they considered as the violation of their homes by 
sanitary agents. Even the municipal authorities believed that health officials 
were too severe in the implementation of sanitary laws and that such severity 
was not justified. Unsanitary houses were burned down and fines for con- 
travening sanitary regulations were issued during house-to-house searches.7 
There were reports of corruption among sanitary agents because of these 
draconian measures; some violations were not reported to the chief medical 
officer. The agent Demba Seck is a good case in point. His area of operation 
was Ndar Toute and Guet Ndar. Eyewitnesses testified that he received gifts 
from residents who did not want their names to be reported as violators of 
sanitary laws. He was fired."7 
The ultimate success of the control measures came in 1909 with the 
elimination of the main breeding grounds for mosquitoes constituted by the 
swamps in the northern part of the city and a section of Sor. The cost was 
7 Curtin, Death by Migration, 80, 107-9. 
77 ANS H 25, Sanitary Council meeting, 21 Oct. 1901o; ANS AOF H 50-125, Deputy- 
Mayor Dumont to governor-general, 13 Oct. I901; ANS AOF H 50-I27, chief medical 
officer to governor-general, 14 Oct. 1901. 
78 ANS H 32, Annual Report I907; see also H 33, hygiene service physician to head 
of health service, 31 Dec. 1909; ANS AOF H 54-31, Governor-General W. Ponty to 
governor, 30 Mar. 191o. 
79 ANS H 8, head of health service to governor, 15 Feb. 1913. 
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estimated at 818,ooo francs.80 The sanitation program in the remaining part 
of Sor and Guet Ndar and Ndar Toute continued between 19 11 and 1914, 
when it was interrupted by the First World War. The medical authorities 
were less successful in convincing sanitary citizens about the importance of 
isolating the individuals who came down with fever in their homes or in a 
hospital ward. Doctor Huot argued that such isolation could 'demoralize' 
the patient and provoke 'a dangerous panic' among the European neigh- 
bors.81 Nevertheless, the combination of police surveillance, fines, health 
education (propagande eclairete) and the implementation of the sanitation 
program had contributed to the reduction of the incidence of yellow 
fever, malaria and dengue fever, and it had reduced the exposure to garbage 
and other waste. Yellow fever remained under control and no major 
epidemic struck the city again until 1927. In the meantime, the health of the 
European population and, indirectly, that of the indigenes, was increasingly 
protected. 
CONCLUSION 
The growth of Saint-Louis in the framework of international trade created 
serious health problems which highlighted the inadequacies of public health 
policies. In this article, I have argued that the miasmatic theory and the 
policies that it inspired provided health officials with a key tool in the man- 
agement of the urban society and race relations. To make sense of the epi- 
demics, the authorities adopted some sanitary measures that were influenced 
by social prejudices. These measures, which identified targets for attack, 
had profound effects on urban life. More and more areas of peoples' lives 
came under the administration's control. The implementation of sanitary 
measures revealed a conflict between the interests of commerce and those of 
public health. The mosquito theory suggested that the solution was the de- 
struction of the mosquitoes, their natural breeding sites and human-made 
sites. But the paradigm did not change the stigmatization of the urban poor 
and the imposition of a form of 'sanitary segregation'. 
The evidence from Saint-Louis does not support the conservative views 
concerning the 'successes' of biomedicine in reducing mortality in Africa 
before the germ theory of disease and the availability of specific drugs. Rather, 
other factors played a key role in the process, including better sanitation, 
salubrious housing, the provision of clean drinking water and the general 
improvement in living conditions that reduced exposure to pathogenic 
microorganisms. From this perspective, the French and British experiences 
with sanitation were similar from the beginning of the public health move- 
ments animated in France by Louis Rene Villerme and in England by Sir 
Edwin Chadwick in the mid-nineteenth century; both had established a 
correlation between poverty and disease and had underscored the role of 
public health measures in saving lives. Some of the sanitary measures 
adopted by the authorities in Saint-Louis contributed to the reduction of 
mortality. 
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Nor does the evidence support liberal accounts of an unqualified balance 
in the record of colonialism on health issues. These accounts have been 
based on the postwar period that witnessed the elaboration of development 
plans inspired by the discussions on 'the native problem in Africa' that went 
on in the 1920s and I930s. The population decline that accompanied the 
colonial conquest was not reversed until then. The evidence seems to cor- 
roborate the radicals' views related to infections and inequalities - based on 
race, class, gender and geographical location - but not their assumption 
centered for the most part on binary oppositions and class division along 
racial lines. 
